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Pegging, Floating, and Price Stability:
Lessons from Taiwan
In recent years, the role of exchange rate policy
in stabilizing prices in small economies has been
widely debated, particularly in Latin America,
where triple-digit inflation rates are often ob-
served. The main question is whether price sta-
bility is more readily achieved by pegging the
exchange rate to a major currency or by allowing
theexchange rate to float. Many observers argue •
that pegging to a major currency, like the u.s.
dollar, is more consistent with price stability
because such a peg enhances domestic mac~
roeconomic discipline. In this view, if a country
pegs to the u.s. dollar, it mustadopt stable fiscal
and monetary policies in order to achieve do-
mestic price stability. Otherwise, the possible
loss of domestic purchasing power would en-
courage a switch to U.S. dollars. This in turn
would exert downward pressure on the domestic
currency and threaten the stability ofthe peg.
Others argue that greater exchange rate flexibility
may be more consistent with price stability, be-
cause such flexibility can insulate a small econ-
omy from external shocks. For example, ifa small
country allows its currency to float, it can offset
inflationary pressures originating from abroad
by allowing its exchange rate to appreciate. It
would enjoy no such flexibility if it pegs to the
u.s. dollar.
The choice ofexchange rate regime is difficult
because the extent to which pegging contributes
to macroeconomic discipline, or flexible ex-
change rates contribute to insulation from exter-
nal shocks, cannot be determined a priori. On
the one hand, the disciplining effects of a cur.:.
rency peg may be small or absent in an already
well-managed economy, or in an economy
where political pressures make tighter monetary
and fiscal policies infeasible. It can also be
argued than an economy can achieve macro-
economic discipline without pegging the ex-
change rate. On the other hand, the degree of
insulation afforded by flexible exchange rates
depends on whether the float is managed so as
to offset the impact ofexternal shocks, as well as
on the nature of external shocks. Most theoretical
models suggest that insulation will be greater if
external shocks are largely monetary in origin.
For these reasons, the relative effects of alterna-
tive exchange rate regimes can be determined
only through empirical study.
This Weekly Letter examines the experience of
Taiwan for evidence on how the choice ofex-
change rate regime affects macroeconomic dis-
cipline and the vulnerability of the domestic
price to external shocks~ Taiwan's exoerience
is of interest because it maintained ~n adjustable
peg to the u.s. dollar for most ofthe 1970s and
then shifted to a managed float in an apparent
effort to insulate the domestic economy from ex-
ternal shocks (Skully and liang 1982). The shift
in policy allows us to assess how the change
in exchange rate regime affected domestic price
stability. Taiwan's experience is also noteworthy
because it was very successful in stabilizing
domestic prices between the 1970s and the
1980s. It thus serves as a potentially instructive
model for other economies that have made little
progress in achieving price stability.
Modeling the economy
To address the issues raised above, a simple
vector autoregression (VAR) model of Taiwan was
estimated. In a VAR, each variable in the model
is regressed on its own lagged values and the
lagged values of other variables in the system.
The equations in a VAR model can be interpreted
as reduced-form specifications that capture the
relationships between variables over time while
requiring little knowledge about the underlying
structureof the economy.
The VAR model consists of five variables. The oil
price and three U.S. macroeconomic variables
(the U.S. consumer price index (CPIl, the u.s.
real rate of interest, and the u.s. trade-weighted
dollar) represent the external sector, while Tai-
wan's CPI is used to represent that economy's
domestic sector. The VAR model was estimated
using quarterly data over two subsamples:FRBSF
1970:1-1978:4, when Taiwan pegged to the u.s.
dollar, and 1979:1-1990:4, when Taiwan largely
maintained a managed float against the u.s. dol-
lar (Taiwan switched to a pure float against the
u.s. dollar in 1989). For ease of exposition, these
two subsamples will be referred to as the 1970s
and the 1980s respectively, although they do not
coincide exactly with those two decades.
The estimates from the VAR model, in combina-
tion with a procedure proposed by Sims (1980),
were used to estimate the sizes of the external
and domestic shocks affecting Taiwan's price.
Sims's procedure allows us to distinguish be-
tween external and domestic shocks, but not
between the underlying sources of these shocks.
For example, shocks to the U.S. price reflect the
combined effects of shocks from external mone-
tary or fiscal policies, technology, labor markets,
and so forth. Similarly, the domestic shocks iden-
tified by the model reflect the combined effects
of government policies and domestic private
sector behavior in Taiwan.
Currency pegs and macroeconomic discipline
To determine the effect of pegging the currency
on macroeconomic discipline in Taiwan, the size
ofthe domestic shocks identified by the model is
compared in the 1970s and the 1980s. If pegging
the exchange rate encouraged greater macro-
economic discipline, one would expect the size
ofdomestic shocks to be smaller in the 1970s
(as a result of more stable government policies),
when Taiwan was pegging to the u.s. dollar,
than in the 1980s, after Taiwan switched to a
managed float.
Contrary to this expectation, the size ofdomestic
shocks in Taiwan (as measured by the standard
deviation of these shocks) fell 64 percent be-
tween the 1970s and the 1980s. The decline in
domestic shocks in Taiwan is particularly striking
because there was an increase in the size ofex-
ternal shocks between the two periods. The
standard deviations of shocks to the oil price,
the u.s. price level, real interest rate, and trade-
weighted dollar increased by 119 percent, 30 per-
cent, 25 percent and 44 percent, respectively.
Thus, in the case ofTaiwan, there is no evidence
that pegging to the u.s. dollar contributed to
greater macroeconomic discipline.
Floating rates and insulation
Proponents of flexible exchange rates emphasize
the benefits of insulating the domestic economy
from external shocks. One way of gauging the
impact of external shocks on the domestic econ-
omy is to compare the magnitude of the re-
sponse of the price level tothese external shocks
during the dollar peg and flexible rate periods.
Ifan external shock of a given size has a smaller
impact on Taiwan's price level during the flexible
rate period, it can be argued that the flexible
exchange rate regime provides insulation.
It is difficult to predict whether anygiven exter-
nal shock will raise or lower the domestic price.
One reason is that each ofthe external shocks
reflects the combined effects of shocks from vari-
ous sources. The response of Taiwan's price will
differ according to which of these effects is dom-
inant. In addition, the response of Taiwan's price
level to these various shocks will be influenced
by the domestic policy responses to the external
shocks.
In spite of uncertainty aboutthe sign of the
expected response to external shocks, it is still
possible to ascertain whether the size of the
responses to these shocks fell when Taiwan
switched to a managed float. To illustrate these
changes, the responses over time of Taiwan's
price level to unit shocks to the u.s. price and to
the oil price over the two subsamples are plotted
in Charts 1 and 2, respectively. In each chart, the
vertical axis measures the logarithm of Taiwan's
CPI, and the horizontal axis measures time in
quarters.
Chart 1 indicates that Taiwan's price level in-
creased in response to a shock to the u.s. price
during both the dollar peg and the managed float
periods. However, the pattern of the response dif-
fers in the two periods. During the dollar peg
period, a shock to the U.S. price produced a very
large short-run response in Taiwan's price level
that was subsequently partly reversed. After Tai-
wan abandoned its peg to the u.S. dollar, the
short-run response to a u.s. price shock was
much smaller, and there was no long-run rever-
sal. In spite of these contrasting responses, it is
clear that the increase in Taiwan's price level
was larger during the dollar peg period at both
short and long horizons.
Chart 2 reveals even more striking differences
between the two periods by illustrating the
responsesof Taiwan's price level to oil price
shocks. During the dollar peg period, an increase
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increase in Taiwan's price level (with a peak im-
pact at around 5 quarters) that was subsequently
reversed. In contrast, during the managed float
period, an increase in the oil price was associ-
ated with a relatively small decline in Taiwan's
price level, possibly because Taiwan's exchange
rate tended to offset changes in the oil price in
this period. As in the case of shocks to the u.s.
price, the size ofthe response of Taiwan's price
level to shocks to the oil price declined during
the managed float period.
First, domestic shocks were larger when Taiwan
pegged to the u.s. dollar, so it appears that a cur-
rency peg does not necessarily enhance macro-
economic discipline. Second, Taiwan appears to
have experienced greater insulation from external
shocks after it abandoned its peg to the u.s. dol-
lar, lending support to those who argue that more
flexible exchange rates enhance insulation. These
two result suggest that an exchange rate peg is
not necessarily the best means for achieving
price stability.
The overall impression conveyed from the charts
is unambiguous: External shocks appear to have
had a smaller impact on Taiwan's domestic price
after it abandoned a dollar peg in favor of a man-
aged float. An analysis of the dynamic responses
to shocks to the u.s. trade-weighted dollar and
to the U.s. real interest rate in both periods (not
shown here) reinforces this impression. These re-
sults suggest that more flexible exchange rates
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Conclusions
The experience of Taiwan provides two important
insights on the choice ofexchange rate regime.
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